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UNDERSTANDING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL
AGENCY ACTION: KAFKAESQUE AND LANGDELLIAN
Gary C. Leedes*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article identifies the key factors that are taken into consider-
ation by federal judges empowered to apply and give doctrinal con-
tent to the rules governing judicial review. The original inspiration
was more modest. The article, as conceived, was to be simply an
attempt to clarify the concept of reviewability. After some thinking
about the topic, the close relationship between the concept of re-
viewability and other concepts' of judicial review became clearer to
me, and I decided that a useful antidote to the customary analysis,
which emphasizes distinctions among these various concepts, is to
emphasize their similarities.
What these concepts governing judicial review have in common
is the fact that they are all largely shaped by judicial discretion.
More to the point, the same factors influence the way a federal
court actually exercises its discretion whether the case is labelled a
"reviewability" case, or is perceived to be a dispute about jurisdic-
tion, standing, ripeness, exhaustion of remedies or scope of review.
* B.S., University of Pennsylvania, 1960; LL.B., Temple University, 1962; LL.M., Harvard
University, 1973. Professor of Law, University of Richmond Law School.
1. A court must consider several concepts in deciding whether a case is subject to judicial
review. Questions of jurisdiction, standing, ripeness and exhaustion of remedies may be raised
to bar judicial intervention. Because any one of these concepts may bar reviewability, they
are often referred to as "threshold obstacles" which must be overcome before a court will
proceed to consider the merits of a case. Even if a court reaches the merits, its scope of review
may be limited by the same factors that shape the concepts governing availability and timing
of review.
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The various labels commonly used to analyze the law governing
judicial review enable us to differentiate between discretion exer-
cised under circumstances in which the issue narrows down to who
may sue, rather than when agency action can be reviewed, or
whether judicial review is appropriate or how much judicial review
is proper. But this convenience which aids analysis too often ob-
scures the fact that the threshold obstacles, and rules for scope of
review, are means by which federal courts balance interests. Words
like standing, ripeness and the rest are convenient as shorthand
descriptive labels,2 but should not imprison legal reasoning or un-
duly constrict the evolving common law-a process that requires
large doses of discretion administered by judges sensitive to the
often competing needs of the agencies, the courts and the individ-
ual. Thus, the argument presented here is that identification of the
key factors3 that channel the exercise of judicial discretion illumi-
nates the relationship among the various rules of judicial review,
dictates many answers to the basic questions of administrative law,
and yet allows administrative law to adjust to changing conditions
and needs of society.
In short, my effort is designed to develop some cross-cutting
themes useful to the understanding of judicial review.
H. REVIEWABILITY
There are several ways to teach the law of reviewability as it
pertains to federal administrative agency action. There is the
2. The substance of the law governing judicial review can be summarized without labels
as follows:
The more grievous the injury to the challenger of agency action, the greater the likelihood
and intensity of review. The more crystallized the legal issue, the more the court is apt to
review; conversely, if the question presented primarily involves facts or political choices
within agency discretion, review is less likely. Judicial review is more likely if the causal
connection between government action and injury is not attenuated and if the remedy re-
quested is traditional, necessary and adequate to provide meaningful relief. Finally, judicial
review is more likely if the court can apply neutral principles of law and resolve the contro-
versy without injecting itself into the substantive policymaking area of a program adminis-
tered by an agency. Judicial review is most likely and most exacting if basic liberties or rights
have been abridged by the agency or if the agency procedures have violated due process of
law. Of course a court will be more or less activist depending on the judge's perception of the
role and duty of the federal courts and his appraisal of the competence of the agency and its
need for autonomy.
3. For a list of these key checklist factors, see text Section III infra.
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straightforward way, meaning one may simply accept at face value
recent Supreme Court opinions that summarize the law as follows:
The Administrative Procedure Act stipulates that the provisions of
that Act authorizing judicial review apply "except to the extent
that-(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is
committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a). It is now
well settled that "judicial review of a final agency action by an ag-
grieved person will not be cut off unless there is a persuasive reason
to believe that such was the purpose of Congress." Abbott Laborato-
ries v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967). The reviewing court must
determine whether "Congress has in express or implied terms pre-
cluded judicial review or committed challenged agency action en-
tirely to administrative discretion." Barlow v. Collins 397 U.S. 159,
165 (1970).'
From these basics, the teacher of the straightforward law will ex-
plain to his students, more or less accurately, that there is a com-
mon law presumption of reviewability codified in the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA),' and that a given federal court will al-
ways review federal agency action unless it is convinced that: (1)
Congress intended to prevent review; or (2) there is no law to apply;
or (3) some unusual reason takes the case outside the judicial do-
main.' Such teaching is calculated to engender a comfortable feeling
on the part of the student that he has a grasp on the concept of
reviewability-which he will then learn to distinguish from discrete
problems such as standing, ripeness, primary jurisdiction, scope of
review, sovereign immunity, jurisdiction and so on. At this level, the
law of reviewability can be presented in nutshell fashion to a class
in administrative law in an attempt to clear up the cases. And yet,
in the end this approach turns out to be Kafkaesque and confus-
ing."-' Needless to say, the straightforward teaching method does not
4. Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 500 (1977) (some citations omitted).
5. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 3105, 3344, 5362, 7521 (1970).
6. See also 3 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRAnVE LAW TRATISE § 28.01 at 2-3 (1958 & Supp. 1970)
(citations omitted) [hereinafter cited as DAVIs].
6.1. One justification for the traditional analysis of judicial review is the advantage of*
reducing the number of legal doctrines to a manageable few. This objective has been accom-
pished by focusing on standing, reviewability and so on. The traditional analysis is faithful
to the Langdellian method which presumes that law is a science which can be made more
understandable by proper classification. On the other hand, the inarticulate and overlapping
1978]
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adequately take into account the variety of competing interests that
influence the application of the law of reviewability in a given case.
A second, and substantially more meaningful, way of approaching
the law of reviewability is to supplement the straightforward ap-
proach with a rationale. Professor Davis accurately describes the
statutory preclusion cases as follows:
When statutes are silent concerning judicial review, as many are, the
administrative action is sometimes reviewable and sometimes not.
When statutes provide that the administrative action "shall be
final," the action is sometimes reviewable and sometimes not. When
statutes provide that the action "shall not be reviewed," the action
is sometimes reviewed and sometimes not.'
For Davis, the decisions "add up to the simple idea that courts in
the future as in the past will continue to be the principal architects
of the law of reviewability." Professor Davis notes that in cases in
which the issue is whether action is committed to agency discretion
by law, "the best generalization may be that courts limit themselves
to issues appropriate for judicial determination." 9 But Davis points
out that courts are the experts in determining the nature and scope
of statutory authority, constitutional limitations and the fairness of
procedures."0 Many aspects of agency action, therefore, may amount
to reviewable abuse of discretion, so long as courts do not get too
enmeshed in specialized agency matters that are beyond its ken.
Thus, a rationale is submitted which helps organize apparent chaos.
This approach, admittedly somewhat oversimplified here, empha-
sizes the comparative competency and expertise of courts and agen-
cies, which is a factor of substantial importance although not the
whole story. Surely Professor Davis would be the first to admit as
much, but he prefers, apparently, not to get bogged down in the
formality of making a list of all the other influences which shape the
aspects of the "reduced" number of legal doctrines in Kafkaesque, not because an aggrieved
party cannot get review but because neither the party, nor the agency nor the courts are ever
quite sure whether review is available. See text accompanying notes 113-16, infra.
7. Id.
8. Id. § 28.08 at 41.
9. K. DAvis, AM misTRATvE LAW: CAsas-TPXT-PROB.S~ 64 (6th ed. 1977).
10. See K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW -TEXT 524 (3d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as DAvis
TEXT].
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law of reviewability. Of course, Davis's discussion of the cases in the
treatise helps us to see for ourselves what these "inarticulate" influ-
ences are.
A third and more difficult way to approach the law of reviewabil-
ity is to attempt to identify in detail the factors that courts actually
take into account before holding agency action to be reviewable,
nonreviewable, unreviewable or partly reviewable. Mr. Saferstein
has compiled a useful list of factors that are relevant to determine
whether an agency's action is committed to its discretion by law: (1)
the breadth of discretion; (2) the expertise and experience required
if the court is to understand the subject matter of agency action; (3)
the managerial nature of the agency; (4) the impropriety of judicial
intervention; (5) the necessity of informal agency decisionmaking;
(6) the inability of the reviewing court to ensure a correct result; (7)
the need for the expeditious operation of congressional programs; (8)
the quantity of potentially appealable agency actions; and (9) the
existence of other methods to prevent agency abuse of discretion."
These factors comprise the list of considerations which Mr. Safer-
stein thinks most often influence court decisions labelled "review-
ability" cases. But to complicate matters further, Saferstein notes
that only rarely "is any of these factors, standing alone, controlling;
rather, their cumulative effect on the interests of the individual,
the agency and the courts determines whether review should be
denied.""2
The perceptive student whose attention is drawn to Mr. Safer-
stein's list will perceive that these very same factors are also rele-
vant when courts attempt to determine if Congress intended to
preclude review.' 3 For example, these factors are taken into account
in the implied preclusion cases. Implied preclusion 4 is a concept
which lay more or less dormant for many years until its recent
resurrection. In Morris v. Gressette,15 the Supreme Court reminded
us that "every judicial holding with respect to implied preclusion
of judicial review is unique; 'the context of the entire legislative
11. Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discre-
tion," 82 HARv. L. RMv. 367 passim (1968).
12. Id. at 379.
13. For a discussion of the express preclusion cases, see text accompanying notes 29-34
infra, and note 7 supra.
14. See section 10 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1970).
15. 432 U.S. 491 (1977).
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scheme,' [which] differs from statute to statute," 6 may add up to
preclusion even though the statute is silent, and even though "there
is no legislative history bearing directly on the issue of reviewabil-
ity."" But what convinces the Court there is implied preclusion?
The factors that influenced the Court in Morris to decide there was
implied preclusion are those that Mr. Saferstein identifies, plus a
few others.
In short, the cumulative effect of many considerations that affect
the interests of the individual, the agency and the courts determine
whether a case is reviewable. I have found in my classes that this
way of teaching the law of reviewability-using the Saferstein
list-is difficult because it leaves many students in the same posi-
tion as the practitioner and the judge: adrift on a sea of amorphous
factors that can be manipulated many ways. The law of reviewabil-
ity is no longer cut and dried, but is fluid and very elusive; but as I
will suggest below, since the very same factors also shape other
doctrines of judicial review, the subject is less Kafkaesque than it
appears.
Ill. THE FACTORS THAT INTEGRATE THE LAW OF REVIEWABILITY WITH
OTHER CONCEPTS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The Davis and Saferstein modes of analysis discussed above view
the concept of reviewability as primarily instrumental. This is real-
istic; one function of the law of reviewability is to allow courts to
avoid exercising jurisdiction if a decision on any aspect of the merits
is inappropriate. To determine whether a decision is inappropriate,
a court should consider its relative ability to decide the issue and
how its decision will impact on: (1) the long and short run interests
of the individuals who challenge agency action; (2) the public (i.e.,
the institution acting for the public interest whether it be the Con-
gress, the executive branch or an agency); and (3) the court's own
position and welfare. Obviously, many equitable and utilitarian
factors are relevant; Saferstein's list of factors surely is not ex-
haustive. To compile an exhaustive list of equitable and utilitarian
factors.to be used as the ultimate checklist in any given case would
16. Id. at 505 n.20 (citation omitted).
17. Id. at 503.
[Vol. 12:469
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be too unwieldy. Therefore, I prefer to condense the operative fac-
tors to five, for use as a quick checklist in the analysis of review-
ability questions as well as other concepts of judicial review.
The checklist:
1. The nature and degree of the injury.
2. The nature of the question presented (legal, factual, mixed,
discretionary, narrow or broad).
3. The obviousness of the agency error as it relates to the chal-
lenger (as shown by the record before the court).
4. The opportunity of the rightholder to obtain relief without
court intervention, and the ability of the court to provide the chal-
lenger with meaningful relief.
5. The impact of judicial intervention on the orderly conduct of
governmental business (including the court's business).
This checklist [hereinafter referred to as the checklist factors]
helps illuminate the close relationship of the various concepts of
judicial review usually treated as separate chapter headings or key
numbers. In the pages that follow, I attempt to explain how refer-
ence to the checklist factors integrates and reduces what appears to
be an unruly diversity to a more manageable unity.' 7
A. Jurisdiction
The list of five factors that shape all the concepts of judicial
review of federal agency action are relevant, indeed often decisive,
in cases where the issue presented is whether a federal court has
jurisdiction. The line between the concept of jurisdiction and
threshold concepts like reviewability, ripeness and others is not sta-
ble; there is quite a bit of overlap. In Morris v. Gressette,'8 for
example, the Court loosely used the terms "jurisdiction" and
"reviewability" interchangeably.' 9 Indeed, jurisdiction and reviewa-
17.1. See diagram Section V infra.
18. 432 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1977).
19. The reviewability concept in administrative law is the analogue of the political question
doctrine, or more generally-but also more accurately-the concept of justiciability. There
are occasions when federal courts lack jurisdiction when cases are nonjusticiable. Muskrat v.
United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911). In such cases, the concepts of jurisdiction and justiciabil-
1978] 475
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bility are concepts that are often conflated. Therefore, it should not
be surprising that the same factors that shape reviewability also
mold the concept of jurisdiction and influence the courts' interpre-
tation (and application) of statutes granting or withdrawing juris-
diction.
This is not to say that Congress does not have tremendous control
over the jurisdiction of federal courts."0 Indeed, it must be recalled
that, except for the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the
jurisdiction of federal courts is conferred and regulated by Con-
gress. 21 Congress has been generous in this respect. Many statutes
that delegate power to federal agencies specifically provide for judi-
cial review in some federal court.22 If there is no specific statutory
review provided, the challenger of agency action can take advantage
of the federal question jurisdictional statute.2" This general grant
empowers United States district courts to decide actions for declara-
tory judgments and injunctions that challengers file against federal
agencies, subject (as are all jurisdictional grants) to the limitations
of the threshold obstacles to judicial review. For example, the statu-
tory preclusion qualification to the right of review, codified in the
APA, 24 is a threshold obstacle which can prevent the district court
from exercising its jurisdiction to some extent-even if Congress
does not intend to eliminate entirely the general federal question
jurisdiction or specifically conferred jurisdiction of the United
ity conflate, just as the concepts of jurisdiction and reviewability are conflated in Morris v.
Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 500 (1977). But, as with reviewability, there are some non-
jurisdictional and non-constitutional aspects of justiciability. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 53 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TRmwE. Accordingly, there are cases in which
the Court refuses to accept constitutionally and statutorily authorized jurisdiction. Id. at 54.
Thus, the concepts are not always conflated. The five factors on the checklist shape the
concept of justiciability in the same manner that the concept of reviewability-the label more
frequently used in administrative law cases-is shaped. See checklist of five factors, text
Section III infra.
In Morris, the relatedness of scope of review concepts with the threshold concepts of judicial
review, discussed separately in detail in text Section III infra, is illustrated by the Court's
statement that "[t]he issue in this case concerns the scope of judicial review of the Attorney
General's failure to interpose a timely objection under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act to a change
in the voting laws of a jurisdiction subject to that Act." 432 U.S. at 493.
20. See U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 2.
21. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2. See generally, HART AND WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1-63 (2d ed. 1973).
22. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(c).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (providing so-called non-statutory review).*
24. See section 10 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (1970).
[Vol. 12:469
UNDERSTANDING JUDICIAL REVIEW
States district courts. It is when a court is convinced there is a valid
statutory preclusion that the reviewability and jurisdiction concepts
are conflated-as in Morris, where the Court held federal courts
were without power to review the inaction of the Attorney General.
In Morris, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the enforcement of a
state reapportionment act on the ground that the state statute had
not been subjected to the required federal scrutiny by the Attorney
General (hereinafter referred to as the "agency"). The basis of the
district court's jurisdiction would have been 28 U.S.C. section
1343(4) if, and only if, section 5 of the Voting Rights Act authorized
the plaintiffs to secure the injunctive relief sought.2 As noted, the
Supreme Court held that Congress had not authorized judicial re-
view of agency inaction, concluding that a reading of the entire
legislative scheme disclosed an implied preclusion. Only if the
agency does interpose objections to state reapportionment may such
agency action be reviewed by the federal courts. This situation,
characterized as "bizarre" by Mr. Justice Marshall, 27 is simply illus-
trative of the point that the federal courts' general jurisdiction to
hear some claims does not necessarily mean the courts have power
to review all claims. The distinction between nonreviewable claims
and reviewable claims depends on how the exercise of agency discre-
tion affects the challenger's interests, the character of the legal
question presented, the ability of the court to perceive obvious
agency error, the availability for the challenger to obtain relief with-
out judicial intervention and the impact of judicial intervention on
the orderly conduct of government business.2 Thus, while Congress
25. 432 U.S. at 498-500, citing Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 557-563
(1969), which explained the interrelationship of 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) and the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973p (1970).
26. 432 U.S. at 501.
27. 432 U.S. at 516 (dissenting opinion).
28. If the "agency" interposes an objection pertinent to the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
judicial review would coordinate rather than disrupt the orderly conduct of governmental
business (checklist factor #5), there would not be an opportunity for the rightholder to obtain
relief without court intervention (checklist factor #4), there would likely be a more detailed
explanation by the "agency" to justify its exercise of discretion which would make an agency
error more detectable (checklist factor #3) and the nature of the question presented would
have legal dimensions not present when a prosecutor fails to act (checklist factor #2). Of
course, the nature and severity of the injury would be different, being irreparable, since there
is no other opportunity for the rightholder to obtain relief when the agency interposes an
objection (checklist factors #1 and #4). Thus the concepts of jurisdiction and reviewability
1978]
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has the first word on jurisdiction, the court's interpretation of a
given statute affecting its power to review a case depends largely on
the five factors on the checklist.
Another case illustrative of the way the five checklist factors af-
fect the courts' decision as to whether it has power to review agency
action is Johnson v. Robison,9 in which the challenger appealed a
decision of the Veterans' Administration. Congress had provided
that, with designated exceptions:
the decisions of the Administrator on any question of law or fact
under any law administered by the Veterans' Administration provid-
ing benefits to veterans . . . shall be final and conclusive and no
other official or any court of the United States shall have power or
jurisdiction to review any such decision by an action in the nature of
mandamus or otherwise.A0
The intent of Congress seemed clear: the jurisdiction of all courts
to review decisions of the Veterans' Administration was entirely
eliminated. But the Supreme Court held this was not the intent of
Congress at all and the statutory language did not preclude review
of the constitutionality of government action. Again, in Johnson,
the nature of the challenger's injury (viz., the alleged deprivation
of a fundamental right, checklist factor #1),31 the legal question
presented (viz., an issue of statutory construction involving the con-
stitutionality of veterans' benefits legislation challenged inter alia
on equal protection and first amendment grounds, (checklist factor
#2) and the unavailability of any remedy if the statutory bar to
jurisdiction was upheld (checklist factor #4), were considerations
that combined to induce the Supreme Court to hold that elimina-
tion of jurisdiction was not the intent of Congress. Moreover, judi-
can, to some extent, be manipulated by the courts to allow them to coordinate the often
conflicting interests of the individual, the agency and the court itself toward the goal of an
effective government, without abdicating the judiciary's power to check agency action if
checking is essential to preserve rights and liberties.
29. 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
30. 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1970).
31. The plaintiff alleged the agency's decision that his conscientious objector status did
not qualify him under 38 U.S.C. § 1652(a)(1) (1970) to veterans' educational benefits was a
violation of his first amendment right to religious freedom and the fifth amendment's guaran-
tee of equal protection of the laws. See 415 U.S. at 363-64.
[Vol. 12:469
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cial review in Johnson did not adversely affect the orderly conduct
of governmental business (checklist factor #5). This decision fol-
lowed long-standing tradition. Recall Professor Jaffe's account of
Dr. Bonham's case:
Coke, then Chief Justice of Common Pleas, allowed Dr. Bonham to
bring an action for false imprisonment (trespass) against the Royal
College of Physicians and Surgeons. This College by royal charter and
statute was authorized to regulate the practice of medicine, and it
had imprisoned Dr. Bonham for contempt. Coke held that the facts
underlying Dr. Bonham's alleged misconduct could be tried by the
court; otherwise he would have no remedy against unauthorized
power. It seems to have been assumed that the common law courts
did have jurisdiction thus to test the validity of official action. 2
Jaffe goes on to quote Coke's famous statement that if an act of
Parliament is "against Common Right and Reason, or repugnant,
or impossible to be performed, the Common Law will controll it, and
adjudge such act to be void. 3 3 Coke's doctrine "lays the basis for a
highly autonomous and powerful judiciary." 34 It was in this venera-
ble tradition that Johnson was decided. Usually, however, courts do
not go to such lengths to obfuscate the intent of Congress unless
most of the checklist factors listed above operate to make judicial
intervention imperative.
An intriguing question arises by supposing the Supreme Court
cannot by the art of statutory construction credibly ignore a partial
elimination of federal court jurisdiction by Congress,35 thus leaving
32. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 329 (abr. student ed. 1965)
[hereinafter cited as JAFF].
33. Id. at 332-33.
34. Id. at 333.
35. With respect to the scope of the Congressional power to regulate the jurisdiction of the
federal courts, there are several distinctions which need to be drawn:
(1) The difference between the complete abolition of Supreme Court jurisdiction and the
negation of the exercise of some of its jurisdiction.
There is no convincing historical evidence that the framers contemplated granting Congress
power to abolish completely the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. See Ratner,
Congressional Power over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv.
157, 161-65 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Ratner]. It would be an odd usage of the word
"exceptions" to take it to mean that the exceptions can completely swallow the rule that it
modifies and thereby destroy "the essential characteristics of the subject to which it applies."
Id. at 170.
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a challenger of agency action seemingly without an opportunity to
appeal to the courts. Can it be that a challenger deprived of a
An important function of the Supreme Court is to maintain uniformity of decisions
throughout the United States to form the Nation into a more perfect union. Id. at 166. This
role is essential and attainable even if the Court had not asserted in Marbury v. Madison, 1
U.S. (I Cranch) 368 (1803), its power to declare Acts of Congress unconstitutional if repug-
nant to the Constitution. But so long as Marbury v. Madison remains the foundation for
modern assertions of Supreme Court authority, the role of the Court includes keeping Con-
gress within its constitutional limits. Therefore, it is doubtful that the Court would rubber-
stamp legislation that, in effect, eliminates essential appellate jurisdiction.
Moreover, aside from the need to maintain uniformity, there are other enforceable constitu-
tional limits on Congress's power to regulate and make exceptions to the Court's appellate
jurisdiction. These limitations include the Bill of Rights, other fundamental rights implicit
or explicit in the Constitution and separation of powers principles; all of which would discour-
age the Court from deferring to Congress if it attempts to enlarge its sphere of authority and
interferes with the effective functioning of the Executive and Judicial branches. United
States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). See also Nixon v. Administrator of General
Seivices, 433 U.S. 425, 441-46 (1977). Having said there are limits on Congress's power to
abolish the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, it must be conceded that it is easy to
overstate the case; the question of the extent to which Congress can limit the Court's appel-
late jurisdiction is still officially open because jurisdictional statutes in force have always
been adequate to allow the Court to carry out its essential responsibilities with reasonable
effectiveness.
(2) The difference between Congressional control over jurisdicton and Congressional control
over the merits of a case or the results in a class of cases.
Congress has attempted to prescribe the rules for Supreme Court decisions; more bluntly,
Congress has attempted to dictate the outcome of specific cases. In United States v. Klein,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871), the Court held such an attempt to be invalid. If the purpose or
effect of a statute is to dictate the result of a case by means of a congressionally designed
restriction on the kinds of issues the Court can consider, the rationale of the Klein case would
be applicable. See P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND
MATERIALS 1332-33 (1975) [hereinafter cited as BREST]. Dictating the result of a case, how-
ever, is not necessarily synonymous with specifying the remedy. Id. at 1323.
(3) The difference between preclusion of Supreme Court appellate review and preclusion
or elimination of lower federal court jurisdiction.
Although a consensus of commentators thinks the Supreme Court may defend its essential
role against disruptive Congressional interference, the conventional wisdom is that Congress
may abolish the lower federal courts, which are solely creatures of statutes. It has been
argued, however, that the caseload increase and changes in the nature of constitutional
litigation compel the retention of the lower federal courts in order to provide adequate access
to litigants trying to protect their constitutional rights. Eisenberg, Congressional Authority
to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L. J. 498, 511-13 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Eisenberg]. Professor Gunther implies the withdrawals of lower federal court juris-
diction might have to pass muster under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment. See G. GUNTHER,
CONS7nTUnoNAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 63 (9th ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as GUNTHER].
See also note 38 infra. Thus, the retention by the lower federal courts of its jurisdiction might
not be a subject solely in the hands of Congress; the Court, no doubt, will have something to
say-if the purpose or effect of abolishing lower court jurisdiction is to destroy constitutional
guarantees.
(4) The difference between the theoretical possibility of Congressional action that cripples
the federal courts and the practical reality; viz., the unlikelihood of such action.
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constitutional right, owing to an official's error of law, is not entitled
to test in court the legitimacy of federal agency action? This impor-
tant question is considered unanswered, but the Supreme Court's
answer to the question in a given case would depend, I submit, on
the checklist factors listed above. There have been occasions when
Congress successfully eliminated the jurisdiction of federal courts to
hear certain kinds of cases, such as Ex parte McCardle," but the
Court's acquiescence and decision (that the repeal of a certain ha-
beas corpus statute was constitutional) can be explained inter alia
on the ground that other habeas corpus remedies were available to
the petitioner (checklist factor #4).31
If no remedies are available to a challenger of allegedly illegal
agency action who has been obviously deprived of a fundamental
constitutional right, what would prevent the Court from hearing an
appeal? As one of the participants in the well-respected Hart Di-
alectic retorted:
Name me one single Supreme Court case that has squarely held that
in a civil enforcement proceeding, questions of law can be validly
withdrawn from the consideration of the enforcement court where no
adequate opportunity to have them determined by a court hAs been
previously accorded. When you do, I'm going back io re-think
Marbury v. Madison."
I have no cases that squarely support the Court's authority to
limit Congress's power to control the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court. But, as Professor Berger argues forcefully, the Con-
stitution itself provides the authority. He notes: "In the sheaf of
36. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
37. Shortly after Ex parte McCardle, the Supreme Court held that the 1868 repeal of the
statute giving it appellate jurisdiction in habeas corpus cases did not affect another statute
under which it could issue original writs of habeas corpus and certiorari. Ex parte Yerger, 75
U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1869). For other commentary on Ex parte McCardle, see materials cited
in GUNTHER, supra note 35.
38. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise
in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1362, 1378-79 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Hart]. This too must
be noted: with the growth of the affirmative welfare state, judicially imposed limits on
Congressional withdrawals of jurisdiction might be imposed in situations where the govern-
ment is withholding benefits as well as in those cases in which the government seeks to subject
a person to a civil enforcement action. Of course the nature and degree of the injury (checklist
factor #1) will be important in such cases.
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Congressional powers, the power to make 'exceptions' to the appel-
late jurisdiction scarcely ranks higher, when measured by indispen-
sability to the largest national purposes, than the commerce, tax
and war powers; yet each of these is subject to the Fifth Amend-
ment. ' 3 Therefore, if the essential plan of the Constitution, as tra-
ditionally understood, is to remain intact, the Court-even when it
cannot credibly construe the exercise of Congressional power depriv-
ing it of jurisdiction narrowly-will nevertheless review the case at
bar depending on:
1. The nature and degree of the injury. 9.'
2. The nature of the question presented.3912
3. The obviousness of the agency error as it relates to the person
seeking relief. 9.3
4. The opportunity of the rightholder to obtain relief without court
39. R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 295 (1969).
39.1. Justice Douglas thought the distinction between Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 506 (1868), and United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1872), depended
on the nature of the injury sustained by the person seeking access to federal court and con-
cluded that, in an era dozninated by laissez fMire attitudes, the Court balked at Congressional
withdrawals of jurisdiction that had the purpose and effect of impairing property rights. See
Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 605 (1962) (dissenting opinion). Probably, Congress cannot
constitutionally limit criminal appeals of defendants subject to the death penalty to those
who waive their sixth amendment right to jury trial. See BREsT, supra note 35, at 1326 n.25;
cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1970) (a case in which the Court invalidated the
sentencing scheme of the Federal Kidnapping Act on the ground that, by allowing the death
penalty to be imposed by a jury but not a judge, the Act unconstitutionally burdened defen-
dant's right to a jury trial).
39.2. Professor Brest asks, rhetorically I presume, whether Congress could
"constitutionally limit the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to appeals by whites or Christians
or Republicans." BREsT, supra note 35, at 1326. Such an exercise of power would, of course,
present legal questions that would make judicial review most likely-despite withdrawal of
jurisdiction. The Court's judicial hackles were raised, in part, in United States v. Klein, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1872), because the legal question presented was whether "Congress
has inadvertently passed the limit which separates the executive from the judicial power,"
and whether it impaired "the effect of a pardon, and thus infring[ed] the constitutional
power of the Executive."
39.3. The Court will strain to find a basis for exercising its jurisdiction when the agency is
flagrantly in error. In Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 120-21 (1946), Justice Douglas,
writing for the Court, said: "We cannot believe that Congress intended that criminal sanc-
tions were to be applied to orders issued by local boards no matter how flagrantly they
violated the rules. . . . We cannot readily infer that Congress departed so far from the
traditional concepts of a fair trial when it made the actions of local boards 'final' as to provide
that a citizen of this country should go to jail for not obeying an unlawful order of an
administrative agency." 327 U.S. at 121-22.
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intervention and the ability of the court to provide the person seeking
relief with a meaningful remedy 94
5. The impact of judicial intervention on the orderly conduct of
governmental business 9 -
In short, jurisdiction is not a metaphysical absolute, but is a con-
cept that often reflects the court's perception of the character and
gravity of an agency's error and its own role as the appropriate in-
stitution to inquire into the circumstances. 0
39.4. As indicated in the text, the availability of other habeas corpus remedies was a key
factor in Ex parte McCardle, a case in which the Court implicitly invited the petitioner to
proceed under § 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. BREST, supra note 35, at 1326 n.26. Con-
versely, the unavailability of meaningful preinduction review was decisive in Estep.
39.5. The discussion by Professor Hart of the "essential role of the Supreme Court in the
constitutional plan", Hart, supra note 38, Professor Ratner's recognition of the need for the
Supreme Court to maintain the supremacy of federal law and to provide for "ultimate resolu-
tion of inconsistent or conflicting interpretations of federal law by state and federal courts",
Ratner, supra note 35, at 161, and Mr. Eisenberg's argument that Congress may no longer
restrict the authority of the lower federal courts in all instances, Eisenberg, supra note 35,
all focus on the impact of judicial intervention, or non-intervention, on the orderly conduct
of governmental business.
40. See also JAm, supra note 32, at 633 n.25.
A persuasive, succinct argument in support of federal court power to review a withdrawal
of its jurisdiction by Congress is made by Professor Tribe. He concludes that "the Supreme
Court possesses the power to review the constitutionality of congressional withdrawals of its
appellate jurisdiction, and lower federal courts [also] possess such power even if the congres-
sional withdrawal encompasses general federal jurisdiction itself." TRIBE, supra note 19, at
39. Tribe notes that the federal courts cannot be deprived of independent judicial fact-finding
power if administrative discretion is an impediment to the exercise of first amendment rights.
Id. at 44, 732 n.2 (citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965)). Thus the nature of
the injury, checklist factor #1, is recognized as crucial. Professor Tribe also notes that
"judicial review of agency determinations of questions of law is said to be constitutionally
required." Id. at 43 (citing St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 84 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring)). Thus, the nature of the question presented, checklist factor #2,
is important. However, as Tribe notes, the federal courts do not review many questions
decided by military courts, so long as a "rough form of justice" is observed. Id. at 44-45. Thus,
checklist factor #3, the obviousness of the error, is relevant. Moreover, federal courts do not
usually interfere with military courts operating in the locality of actual war, presumably
because the ability of the federal courts to provide meaningful relief is nil (checklist factor
#4). Id. at 45. Another limitation noted by Tribe is the impact of judicial intervention on the
orderly conduct of government business. Id. at 44 n.45. This limitation, suggested by the
Court in Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973), demonstrates the pertinence of
checklist factor #5. The Palmore opinion recogized "the requirements of Art. III, which are
applicable where laws of national applicability and affairs of national concern are at stake,
must in proper circumstances give way to accommodate plenary grants of power to Congress
to legislate with respect to specialized areas having particularized needs and warranting
distinctive treatment." 411 U.S. at 407-08.
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B. Standing to Sue
The federal law of standing is in part a jurisdictional concept and
in part a means for screening out improper plaintiffs who lack
standing for prudential reasons. Standing generalizations appear
largely worthless to some, incoherent to others and admittedly there
are some doctrinal labyrinths.4' Yet the path is less puzzling if a
more macroscopic view is taken, for the standing concept is inti-
mately related to the law of reviewability as well as other threshold
doctrines of judicial review. This should not be surprising because
the law of standing is shaped by the same five considerations listed
above (the checklist factors).
In Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization," the Su-
preme Court made it clear that in the absence of a valid statute
conferring standing, a challenger to agency action in federal court:
41. See Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REv.
663 (1977).
42. 426 U.S. 26 (1976). In Simon, the plaintiffs sought judicial review and relief from an
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) ruling on the ground that the ruling violated the Internal
Revenue Code by giving favorable treatment to non-profit hospitals that provided only lim-
ited service to indigents (emergency room service). The action was brought under § 702 of
the APA which gives a right to judicial review to any person "adversely affected or aggrieved
by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute." According to the Supreme Court,
plaintiffs' allegations fell short of establishing that they stood to profit in some personal
interest if the Court declared the IRS ruling invalid. Therefore, the Court held that their
abstract concern with the subject matter did not substitute for the concrete injury required
by Article III of the Constitution. The Court explained that "it is purely speculative whether
the denials of service specified in the complaint . .. result from decisions made by the
hospitals without regard to tax implictions." 426 U.S. at 42-43. Moreover, it was "equally
speculative whether the desired exercise of the court's remedial powers in this suit would
result in the availability to [plaintiffs] of such [hospital] services." Id. at 43. In short,
plaintiffs failed to allege an injury that could be fairly traced to the challenged agency action.
The Simon case illustrates the close affinity between the doctrines of ripeness and standing.
Note that Justice Brennan, who concurred in the judgment, dissented because the "threat"
of harm to plaintiffs caused by the alleged encouragement to all non-profit hospitals (that in
turn resulted from the Ruling) was unripe for adjudiction.
The unripeness, according to Justice Brennan, inhered in the fact that there was need for
some further clarification of the IRS ruling: "some further procedure, some further contin-
gency of application or interpretation . . . serves to make remote the issue which was sought
to be presened to the Court." 426 U.S. at 51-52. In short, Justice Brennan, dissenting, agreed
that the challenged IRS ruling raised questions which should not be adjudicated in the
abstract and in general, but which required a "'concrete setting' for determination." Id. at
52, quoting Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. 167, 197 (1967). The error of the majority,
Brennan asserted, was its failure to isolate the question of standing from questions of reviewa-
bility, ripeness and the merits. For my comments on Justice Brennan's position, see note 63
infra.
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must allege some threatened or actual injury resulting from the puta-
tively illegal (agency) action before a federal court may assume juris-
diction . . . . In other words, the case and controversy limitation of
Art. IH still requires that a federal court act only to redress injury that
fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant, and
not injury that results from the independent action of some third
party not before the court. 3
A decision that a party has standing obviously involves considera-
tion of factor #1 on the list; viz., the nature and degree of the injury.
Checklist factor #2-the nature of the question presented-is in-
volved because the plaintiff's injury must be related to an interest
created, protected or regulated by common law, statute or constitu-
tional provision.4 The causal connection requirement, articulated
in Simon, also implicates checklist factor #3-the obviousness of the
agency error as it relates to the plaintiff as shown by the record. 5
An additional standing requirement emphasized in Simon is that
plaintiff must show that his requested remedy, if granted by the
court, will provide him with meaningful relief." This requirement
conforms to checklist factor #4. Finally, checklist factor #5, i.e., the
impact of judicial intervention on the orderly conduct of govern-
mental business (including the court's business), is the theme that
runs implicitly throughout the Simon opinion because it is the dom-
inant underlying policy concern of the Article III case or controversy
limitation in the Constitution. Some Supreme Court Justices are at
times emphatic about the relevance of checklist factor #5 in stand-
ing cases in which prudential concerns are determinative. For exam-
ple, in United States v. Richardson,47 Mr. Justice Powell notes it is
awkward in a democratic society for non-elected judges to supervise
the representative branches of government (and their agencies)
merely because a taxpayer requested a district court to give him
relief. 8 Justice Powell also notes that wholesale judicial receptivity
to public interest suits by persons who cannot distinguish them-
43. 426 U.S. at 41-42.
44. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153
(1970).
45. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976).
46. Id. at 38, 45-46.
47. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
48. Id. at 188 (concurring opinion).
1978]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
selves from other citizens risks impairment of the federal court's
effectiveness in protecting the personal rights and liberties of indi-
viduals and minority groups (this also relates to the nature of the
legal question presented); moreover, he expresses concern about: (1)
uneven and sporadic review of varying quality depending on the
resources of the particular plaintiff; and (2) the possibility that
Congress might exercise its authority to diminish judicial power."
In short, the recent retrenchment that has shored up the threshold
obstacles that confront "public interest" plaintiffs has occurred, in
part, because of prudential concerns relevant to checklist factor #5.1
The law regarding standing to assert the rights of third persons
not parties to the litigation is also instrumental: it prevents unwar-
ranted judicial intervention that has a detrimental impact on the
orderly conduct of governmental business (checklist factor #5).11 As
the Court in Singleton v. Wulff , notes inter alia, the standing re-
quirement is utilized "as one means by which the courts avoid un-
necessary constitutional adjudication. 15 3 Nevertheless, a plaintiff
who has himself suffered an injury in fact can often obtain judicial
review by asserting the rights of third parties if there is a genuine,
substantial obstacle to the assertion by the third party of his own
rights (checklist factor #4); for example, where an organization
member's associational right to anonymity would be relinquished
by the publicity attendant upon bringing suit. 4 Another required
element in jus tertii cases is that the plaintiff and the third party
rightholder have a special or close relationship, thus the alleged
agency error must relate to the plaintiff at least indirectly5 (check-
list factor #3). Moreover, federal courts show a special solicitude for
persons asserting the rights of others if the question presented indi-
cates such legal rights are especially important or fundamental 6
(checklist factor #2). Obviously, checklist factor #1, the nature of
the injury (direct or indirect) and the extent to which rights of third
49. Id. at 188-197.
50. See generally, Leedes, Mr. Justice Powell's Standing, 11 U. RICH. L. REv. 269 (1977).
51. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193 (1977).
52. 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
53. Id. at 114.
54. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
55. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114-15 (1976).
56. Id. at 116.
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parties have been diluted are important considerations whenever
such third party rights are asserted by plaintiffs or defendants.
Clearly then, the law of standing relating to a party's own rights
or his privilege to assert the rights of third persons or the public57 is
based on equitable and utilitarian considerations that facilitate the
coordination by courts of the interest of the individual, the public
and the courts themselves. The most significant considerations co-
incide with the factors in the checklist.
Before going on to discuss ripeness, the close relationship between
standing and reviewability should be pointed out. Standing rules,
of course, designate who may bring suit, whereas reviewability re-
lates to whether judicial review is available at the behest of the
plaintiff. 8 But section 702 of the APA pertains both to standing
and reviewability, virtually lumping together both concepts, and
the Court's opinions (e.g., Barlow v. Collins59) that articulate the
"zone of interests" test also illustrate the connection between the
two doctrines. 0 Moreover, standing and reviewability are both, in
a sense, jurisdictional concepts, yet both concepts can also be used
as vehicles to discuss the Court's prudential concerns. More perti-
nent to the thesis of this article, the same factors operate to shape
both concepts; this integrates their relationship (as instrumental
concepts to control agencies without either undue judicial interfer-
ence on the one hand or abdication of judicial responsibility on the
other).
C. Ripeness
There is also a close affinity between the concepts of ripeness and
standing. Indeed, in Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Organization,6 Mr. Justice Brennan concurred in the Court's judg-
ment, but thought lack of ripeness rather than standing was the
fatal flaw in the record.2 Basically the same factors which operated
57. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
58. See Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 169 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in result and
dissenting).
59. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
60. Id. at 160-67. See also id. at 168-75 (Brennan, J., concurring in result and dissenting).
61. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
62. Id. at 46, 50.
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to convince the majority that plaintiffs lacked standing convinced
Justice Brennan that the issues were unripe.
Justice Brennan's preference for liberalized judicial review influ-
ences him to treat standing, reviewability, ripeness and other doc-
trines as discrete entities that can be analyzed in isolation from each
other.13 However useful and legitimate this type of discrete analysis
might be in periods of judicial activism, it is misleading to pretend
63. There is an explanation for this preference; Justice Brennan knows there is a presump-
tion of reviewability but not of standing, and that the isolation of reviewability from standing
enhances the likelihood of judicial review of the merits if standing barriers are lowered.
Mr. Justice Brennan's technique in standing cases appears to give tremendous weight to
checklist factor #1 (injury in fact) and appears to ignore all the other factors on the checklist.
This approach results in lower standing barriers because it avoids the cumulative effect of
those factors on the checklist that influence more conservative judges to deny a plaintiff
standing to sue despite the presence of some trivial injury, basing the denial on tenuous
theories of causation. However, Justice Brennan does not actually ignore factor #5 on the
checklist; he, as an activist, just views it differently from judges who are not activists.
According to Brennan, checklist factor #5 (concern with the impact of judicial intervention
on the orderly conduct of government business) is served by liberalizing standing rules be-
cause as he sees it:
In our modern-day society, dominated by complex legislative programs and large-
scale governmental involvement in the everyday lives of all of us, judicial review is
essential both for the protection of individuals harmed by that action, .. .and to
ensure that the attainment of congressionally mandated goals is not frustrated by
illegal action.
426 U.S. at 65.
Although in standing cases Mr. Justice Brennan does not emphasize other factors on the
checklist, even he concedes that "the only constitutional, 'case or controversy,' policy affect-
ing the law of standing," 426 U.S. at 52, is the requirement that the plaintiff have a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy-an allusion to the ability of the Court to provide
the plaintiff with meaningful relief (checklist factor #4).
He also concedes that in response to a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff must
make some showing sufficient to create a material issue of fact as to whether there is any
connection between challenged agency action and the alleged injury to the plaintiff (checklist
factor #3). For example, in Simon, Mr. Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment in part
because "Itihere is absolutely no indication in the record that the contested ruling altered
the operation of these hospitals in any way, or that the tax-exempt status of these hospitals
was in any way related to the Ruling." 426 U.S. at 54.
Justice Brennan does not completely ignore checklist factor #2, the legal question pre-
sented, when he recognizes, "If the alleged legal interest is clearly frivolous, . ... the plaintiff
can be hastened from court by summary judgment. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 175 n.10
(1970) (emphasis added). Justice Brennan would also agree that the "more 'distinctive or
discriminating' the harm alleged and the more clearly it is linked to the defendant's action,
the more easily a plaintiff may meet the constitutional test" for standing. Id. at 172 n.5
(checklist factors #1 and #3). In sum, even a justice who tries to isolate standing from other
concepts of judicial review cannot ignore the factors that shape all the concepts including
standing.
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all these threshold doctrines are not shaped by substantially the
same considerations. Although the ripeness cases do focus on the
concreteness of the issues, even Mr. Justice Brennan in Baker v.
Carr' recognized that the doctrine of standing (plaintiff's personal
stake in the controversy) is a means to "assure that concrete ad-
verseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
Court so largely depends for illumination of difficult questions. '65
In this formulation, there is recognition of the intimate relationship
between standing and ripeness.
As with other threshold doctrines, ripeness is an instrumental
concept which as Mr. Justice Harlan noted involves balancing the
interests of the individual, the agencies and the courts." In a case
arguably unripe, the courts "evaluate both the fitness of the issues
for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding
court consideration.""7 By his reference to the "parties," Justice
Harlan was sensitive both to the interests of the individual chal-
lenging agency action and the agency itself; by his reference to fit-
ness of the issues, Justice Harlan meant to protect the interests of
the courts who have the responsibility to decide the questions pre-
sented as fairly and as accurately as possible."
From the overview just presented, the following points are ger-
mane to the thesis of this article: (a) the hardship to the individual
and how contingent and speculative it is are considerations perti-
nent to ripeness concepts (checklist factor #1); (b) in ripeness cases,
the fitness of the issues often relates to how broad or narrow the
question presented is and whether it is primarily a legal question or
a factual question (checklist factor #2); (c) the obviousness of the
agency error as it relates to the plaintiff as shown by the record
before the court is an extremely important factor in ripeness cases,
as Mr. Justice Brennan's dissent in Simon69 indicates (checklist
factor #3); moreover, pre-enforcement review of rules and policy
is often denied for lack of ripeness when further proceedings will
64. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
65. Id. at 204.
66. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967).
67. Id. at 149.
68. Id.
69. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
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clarify and narrow the focus of the issue; 0 (d) the inability of the
plaintiff to obtain adequate relief without timely court intervention
was determinative in Abbott 7' (checklist factor #4); and (e) as al-
ready noted, the rationale of ripeness which in part focuses on th
hardship of the individual challenger, the agency and the courts (if
the issues are not fit) are considerations which implicate checklist
factor #5. Thus the same factors which shape the concept of reviewa-
bility and standing also shape the concept of ripeness.
Before turning to the exhaustion of remedies rules, the reciprocal
relationship between the fitness of the issues and the hardship to the
plaintiff should be emphasized to demonstrate the affinity between
the doctrines of ripeness and standing. As the harm to the plaintiff
becomes more distinct and palpable72 and less trifling, contingent
and speculative, the issues narrow and become better focused (fit)
to decide. As the causal connection between the alleged harm and
the agency's action becomes more obvious and immediate, the is-
sues become clarified. In brief, if the plaintiff has no sufficiently
distinctive personal interest in the controversy, he might fail to
provide a federal court with the required assurance that the issues
will be sufficiently ripe to illuminate the difficult questions pre-
sented. In this connection, consider whether Laird v. Tatum" was
a standing or a ripeness case. What kind of case was Roe v. Wade? 4
Too often in poorly reasoned opinions the various relevant factors
have been lumped under the one label or the other. 5 But the
Court's decision in Laird and Roe v. Wade turned not on which
70. See, e.g., Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
71. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967).
72. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 172 n.5 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in result and
dissenting)(quoting Professor Jaffe).
73. 408 U.S. 1 (1972). The Laird opinion was based on the premise that the disputed
practice challenged, Army surveillance of citizens, did not present the plaintiffs with any
present or immediately threatening injury resulting from specific official action.
74. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Court dismissed the complaint of John and Mary Doe, a
married, childless couple, who claimed that pregnancy would risk Mrs. Doe's health and
wanted assurance that an abortion would be legal if Mrs. Doe became pregnant. For some
difficult questions posed concerning this claim, see GUNTHER, supra note 35, at 1589. The
Court's dismissal of the Does' claim has been interpreted as a ripeness opinion that was
inadvertently flawed by its reliance on the law of standing. See Monaghan, Constitutional
Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L. J. 1363, 1381 (1973).
75. Since the same considerations shape both standing and ripeness, it is not always
enlightening to separate both concepts into two watertight compartments.
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label was "right" or "wrong," but on each Justice's view of the
proper role and duty of the Court (which in turn implicates the
five checklist factors).
D. Exhaustion of Remedies
The rule that requires exhaustion of administrative remedies is
concerned, in part, with promoting proper relationships between the
courts and administrative agencies charged with regulatory duties.76
The rule is invoked if a federal court is convinced that Congress
intends to require the challengers of agency action to pursue oppor-
tunities for review at the agency level, or if a court deems it desira-
ble to give the agency an opportunity to correct the alleged illegal-
ity.17 The exhaustion of remedies requirement controls the timing of
judicial review; that is, when an individual challenging agency ac-
tion is entitled to judicial relief. In this respect, it is very similar to
the doctrine of ripeness78 and is often confused with the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction (which determines whether the agency or court
should act first)." Usually the exhaustion of remedies rule is in-
voked when an individual challenges an agency decision in the na-
ture of an order rather than an agency rule (regulation, ruling, or
statement of policy), unless of course the rule is not final and an
appeal can be filed within the administrative hierarchy.
The reasons that justify frequent use of the exhaustion of reme-
dies doctrine have been spelled out by the Supreme Court in
McKart v. United States:"0
The reasons for. . . judicial application of the exhaustion doctrine
... are not difficult to understand. A primary purpose is, of course,
the avoidance of premature interruption of the administrative pro-
cess. The agency, like a trial court, is created for the purpose of
applying a statute in the first instance. Accordingly, it is normally
desirable to let the agency develop the necessary factual background
76. See United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59 (1956) (dictum).
77. See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-95 (1969).
78. Of course, an issue can be unripe even if the challenger has no opportunity to appeal
the agency action within the bureaucracy (i.e., at the agency level).
79. See United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59 (1956). See generally DAvIs TEXT,
supra note 10, at 373-74. See also note 93 infra.
80. 395 U.S. 185 (1969).
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upon which decisions should be based. And since agency decisions are
frequently of a discretionary nature or frequently require expertise,
the agency should be given the first chance to exercise that discretion
or to apply that expertise. And of course it is generally more efficient
for the administrative process to seek aid from the courts at various
intermediate stages. The very same reasons lie behind judicial rules
sharply limiting interlocutory appeals.
Closely related to the above reasons is a notion peculiar to adminis-
trative law. The administrative agency is created as a separate entity
and invested with certain powers and duties. The courts ordinarily
should not interfere with an agency until it has completed its action,
or else has clearly exceeded its jurisdiction. As Professor Jaffe puts
it, "[tihe exhaustion doctrine is, therefore, an expression of execu-
tive and administrative autonomy." This reason is particularly perti-
nent where the function of the agency and the particular decision
sought to be reviewed involve exercise of discretionary powers granted
the agency by Congress, or require application of special expertise
... . Particularly, judicial review may be hindered by the failure of
the litigant to allow the agency to make a factual record, or to exercise
its discretion or apply its expertise. In addition, other justifications
for requiring exhaustion in cases of this sort have nothing to do with
the dangers of interruption of the administrative process. Certain
very practical notions of judicial efficiency come into play as well. A
complaining party may be successful in vindicating his rights in the
administrative process. If he is required to pursue his administrative
remedies, the courts may never have to intervene. And notions of
administrative autonomy require that the agency be given a chance
to discover and correct its own errors. Finally, it is possible that
frequent and deliberate flouting of administrative processes could
weaken the effectiveness of an agency by encouraging people to ignore
its procedures.8'
The McKart case, quoted above, recognizes that the doctrine
of exhaustion of remedies, like most concepts governing judicial
review, is subject to numerous exceptions.82 For example, a com-
plaining party will be excused from exhausting administrative rem-
edies when it is obvious that such effort will be wasted or futile.,
81. Id. at 193-95.
82. See Id. at 193, citing Layton & Fine, The Draft and Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies, 56 GEo. L.J. 315, 322-31 (1967).
83. See, e.g., American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Acree, 475 F.2d 1289, 1292 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
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Another example is where the administrative appeal or other agency
remedy is perceived to be a sham owing to the bad faith of officials,
or where the record clearly shows that administrative remedies are
inadequate. 4 Exhaustion of remedies is not always required when
compliance with the appeal structure within the administrative hi-
erarchy abridges constitutional rights, such as when first amend-
ment rights are chilled, or when the court decides that the agency
lacks adequate capability to determine the constitutionality of the
statute that empowers it to act. 5
A recurrent issue in exhaustion of remedies cases is whether an
administrative agency's jurisdiction can be challenged before the
administrative agency issues its final order. After analysis of many
such cases, Professor Davis notes: "When irreparable injury will
result from the administrative proceeding and the lack of jurisdic-
tion clearly appears from considerations which are not within the
agency's specialized understanding, imposing the exhaustion of
remedies requirement would be both unjust and impractical." 6
Davis submits the following three factors are the relevant considera-
tions in these cases involving a claim that the agency is acting
without jurisdiction: (1) the extent of injury that would result from
pursuit of an administrative remedy; (2) the degree of clarity or
doubt about administrative agency jurisdiction; and (3) the involve-
ment of specialized administrative understanding in the question of
jurisdiction."
Although not many courts have formally adopted Professor
Davis's three-prong test,8 his list of three factors is pertinent. How-
ever, the Davis list is incomplete. Professors Gellhorn and Byse have
compiled a more complete list of five factors 9 that, not so coinciden-
tally, track the checklist factors in Section 111 of this article (the list
which I submit shapes all doctrines of judicial review). When the
exhaustion of remedies cases are analyzed, and the analysis is not
84, 3 DAvIS, supra note 6, § 20.04.
85. For a presentation of the conflicting Supreme Court decisions, see DAvis, supra note 6.
See also K. DAVIs, ADMINMSTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 20.04 (1976).
86. 3 DAVIs, supra note 6, § 20.03 at 68.
87. Id. at 69.
88. But see Lone Star Cement Corp. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1964).
89. This portion of the discussion is based on an outline by W. Gellhorn and C. Byse which
was privately circulated among their colleagues and is not available to the general public.
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limited just to those cases involving challenges to agency jurisdic-
tion, it is evident that one or more of the factors identified by Gell-
horn and Byse are usually decisive. According to Gellhorn and Byse,
when the relevant substantive statute does not provide an explicit
answer to the court's inquiry respecting exhaustion of remedies, the
following considerations become pertinent: (1) the extent, immin-
ence and gravity of the harm alleged (factor #1 on checklist); (2) the
character of the question involved (factor #2 on checklist); (3) the
adequacy of the administrative procedure to remedy the alleged
error (factor #4 on checklist); (4) the grossness or obviousness of the
alleged error (factor #3 on checklist); and (5) the extent to which
resort to the court would interfere with the efficient operation of the
agency (factor #5 on checklist)."o
Gellhorn and Byse explain that many of the "exhaustion of reme-
dies" cases turn on these factors and make sense, or can be recon-
ciled, only by appreciating the importance of such factors.' I shall
not repeat their excellent analysis, except to remark that they say
the "strongest case for not requiring exhaustion is one which pres-
ents a grievous injury based on a plain error of law in a situation
where the injury could not be remedied by following the administra-
tive procedure."92 Relevant to the thesis of this article, note that
such a situation would also be a strong case for not denying the
challenger's right to obtain immediate judicial review on the
grounds of lack of standing, lack of ripeness or unreviewability.
Thus the value of the Gellhorn and Byse list of five factors goes
beyond helping us understand the exhaustion of remedies doctrine;
with a little tinkering, it can be utilized to make sense out of most
cases involving threshold obstacles to judicial review.
E. Scope of Review
Rather than repeat the same analysis undertaken in the foregoing
sections with respect to the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and
considerations pertinent to the propriety of a court order to stay
agency action pending review,' I believe it will be more interesting
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. This footnote will sketch the argument the author would make if the topics referred to
above in the text were fully discussed.
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to demonstrate that the same factors which shape the threshold
obstacles to judicial review also influence a court's scope of review.
The Supreme Court has recognized that a judicial stay to postpone the effective date of
agency action in order to preserve the status quo "is not a matter of right . . . [it is an
exercise of judicial discretion. The propriety of its issue is dependent on the circumstances
of the particular case." Virginian Ry. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 658, 672-73 (1926). See
generally W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 256-262 (2d
ed. 1947) [hereinafter cited as GELLHORN & Bysz]. One federal court has listed the factors
governing its issuance of a stay order (or the denial of a Motion for Stay) as follows:
(1) Has the petitioner made a strong showing that it is likely to prevail on the
merits of its appeal? Without such a substantial indication of probable success, there
would be no justification for the court's intrusion into the ordinary processes of admin-
istration and judicial review.
(2) Has the petitioner shown that without such relief, it will be irreparably injured?
The key word in this consideration is irreparable. Mere injuries, however substantial,
in terms of money, time and energy necessarily expended in the absence of a stay, are
not enough. The possibility that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will
be available at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation, weighs heavily against
a claim of irreparable harm. But injury held insufficient to justify a stay in one case
may well be sufficient to justify it in another, where the applicant has demonstrated
a higher probability of success on the merits.
(3) Would the issuance of a stay substantially harm other parties interested in the
proceedings? On this side of the coin, we must determine whether, despite showings
of probable success and irreparable injury on the part of petitioner, the issuance of a
stay would have a serious adverse effect on other interested persons. Relief saving one
claimant from irreparable injury, at the expense of similar harm caused another, might
not qualify as the equitable judgment that a stay represents.
(4) Where lies the public interest? In litigation involving the administration of
regulatory statutes designed to promote the public interest, this factor necessarily
becomes crucial. The interests of private litigants must give way to the realization of
public purposes. The public interest may, of course, have many facets-favoring at
once both the rapid expansion of utilities and the prevention of wasteful and repetitive
proceedings at the taxpayers' or consumers' expense; both fostering competition and
preserving the economic viability of existing public services; both expediting adminis-
trative or judicial action and preserving orderly procedure.
Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm'n., 259 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
The reader can see that the factors listed by the court substantially track the factors on the
checklist.
The primary jurisdiction cases present problems concerning the proper allocation of busi-
ness between federal courts and administrative agencies. The cases make it clear that a
federal court will usually abstain from exercising its jurisdiction whenever the agency has
concurrent jurisdiction in the interests of uniformity of regulation, and whenever the judiciary
can benefit from prior consideration by an agency. See, e.g., Texas & Pac. R.R. v. Abilene
Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907) (checklist factor #5). The administrative procedures,
however, must be adequate to provide a meaningful remedy. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397
(1970) (checklist factor #4). the question presented is crucial, for if the resolution of the
controversy calls "for the exercise of high degree of expert and technical knowledge," Far East
Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 573 (1952), quoting United States Navigation Co.
v. Cunard Steamship Co., 284 U.S. 474, 485 (1932), courts are less likely to assume initial
jurisdiction. Compare United States v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59 (1956) with Great
N. Ry. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285 (1922). See also, GELLHORN & BYSE, supra
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The scope of judicial review of agency adjudications varies in
intensity. Although there are many formulas and gradations of
scrutiny noted in the cases and the statutes governing scope of re-
view, the major distinction to keep in mind is the difference between
what is correct and what is rational. 4 A federal court is willing to
substitute its own independent judgment for the agency if it is vi-
tally concerned with correct decisions;9 5 the court, however, will
defer to the agency views if simply a rational solution to a contro-
versy is deemed acceptable.
More often than not, a rational solution to an agency-adjudicated
controversy is deemed acceptable and the court in such cases will
defer to the agency-whether the formula of review be labelled the
substantial evidence rule, the arbitrary, capricious and abuse of
discretion formula or some other "rational basis" test. This custom-
ary deference is justified on the theory that Congress empowered the
agency, not the courts, to implement the statute delegating the
agency power. However, if the individual challenging the agency
adjudication (formal or informal) complains that the agency proce-
dures were unfair, or that the agency erroneously and impermissibly
interpreted a statute or the Constitution, a court is more likely to
exercise its own independent judgment (as federal courts are em-
powered to do under the APA).9 7 This is not to say the courts exer-
cise independent judgment each time an agency applies a statute
or a statutory term to a set of facts; the routine, particularized
application of statutes to factual situations is typically reviewed
under some kind of rational basis test, unless the court decides the
agency impermissibly violated some general policy specified by
at 293-99 (checklist factor #2). Finally, the nature of some injuries are deemed beyond the
reach of administrative agencies, so the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is not invoked,
GELLHORN & BysE, supra at 308, and some common law wrongs resulting in injuries not
usually the grist of the administrative process are more likely to be reviewed initially by
federal courts-despite the doctrine of primary jurisdiction (checklist factor #1). See Nader
v. Allegheny Airlines, 426 U.S. 290 (1978).
94. See generally, H. LEVENTHAL, NATrE- AND SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN FEDERAL ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE LAW: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 295-319 (P.L.I. 1977) [hereinafter cited as
LEVENTHAL].
95. See, e.g., Packard Motor Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
96. Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941). But see Nathanson, Administrative Discretion in
the Interpretation of Statutes, 3 VAND. L. REV. 470, 473-475 (1950) (contra analysis of Gray
v. Powell).
97. Section 10 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
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Congress. Deferential review is more commonplace because an
agency's application of statutes and statutory terms usually is not
novel or peculiar: so long as the agency stays within the bounds of
the broad legislative policy articulated in the statute, as interpreted
by a court, its routine application will not be disturbed although
reasonable men might disagree on the wisdom of the results reached
in a particular case. On the other hand, the federal courts (not the
agency), being the experts on statutory construction, construe legis-
lation without deference whenever a novel or peculiar agency appli-
cation of a statute raises a major question of general policy." How-
ever, even the rational basis test is made of rubber, not wood, and
in some special cases a court takes a harder look at the record, or
insists on a more complete record than in other cases."
With respect to the scope of review of agency rules, there is no
requirement in the APA that federal courts defer to the agency's
promulgation of interpretive rules or its statements of policy. ' ° If,
however, the rule under scrutiny is a legislative rule, then a rational
basis test, that is, a minimal level of scrutiny, is applied"1°-unless,
as in adjudications, the question presented concerns alleged grossly
98. The analysis stated here is arguably more consistent with what courts ought to do
rather than descriptive of what they always do. As recognized by Judge Friendly, "there are
two lines of Supreme Court decisions on this subject which are analytically in conflict, with
the result that a court of appeals must choose the one it deems more appropriate for the case
at hand." Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 49 (2d Cir. 1976). The
analysis stated above attempts to reconcile the two divergent lines of cases noted by Judge
Friendly, but admittedly is not altogether successful in that respect. See also 4 DAvis, supra
note 6, §§ 30.01, 30.07, 30.14.
Professor Davis is surely right when he states the choice between independent judgment
and rational basis is largely for judicial discretion. Id. at § 30.08. My point is simply to
emphasize the factors that influence which way a court will exercise its discretion if the
questions pertaining to scope of review are similar to those factors which shape the law
pertaining to the threshold obstacles.
99. The "hard look" doctrine invoked in "special" cases requires the agency to demonstrate
that "it has taken a hard look at the salient issues by stating the basis for its decision with
greater care and clarity than in the ordinary case." LEvFNTHAL, supra note 94, at 315, citing
WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC,
444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1956), quoting
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also
Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. Rv.
509, 515-17 (1974).
100. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976); Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
101. See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425-26 (1977).
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unfair procedures, failure to comply with specified procedures, im-
permissible statutory or constitutional interpretation, or involves a
subject peculiarly within a court's competence. 02
All these generalizations, of course, only give us the relevant con-
ceptual language employed by courts when they review agency ac-
tion on the merits; they are not very useful to predict the outcome
of litigation-as noted, it is not rare for a court ostensibly reviewing
the case under a rational basis test to give the record a very hard
look;10 3 yet is is also not surprising if a court defers to the agency,
even though it is empowered to substitute its own judgment.
The outcome of litigation is also difficult to predict because a
court's decision to use a rational basis test or to substitute its inde-
pendent judgment, and the various refinements and gradations of
scrutiny that complicate the subject of scope of review, are influ-
enced to a substantial degree by the same list of factors that shape
the concepts governing the power and the propriety of judicial re-
view. The list of factors obviously presents a wide variety of possibil-
ities which makes prediction of outcome difficult. Nevertheless, cer-
tain kinds of cases are likely candidates for close judicial scrutiny.
For example, if the plaintiff's injury involves agency interference
with a fundamental right such as freedom of speech (checklist factor
#1), a court will likely review the facts of the case more carefully,
and will engage in more exacting scrutiny of the agency action." 4
Indeed, the nature of plaintiffs injury controls whether the due
process clause is applicable since it obtains only when the agency
deprives a person of life, liberty, or property."5 Checklist factor #2
is always crucial, for, as noted, if the legal question presented is
novel, or if it involves constitutional rights, fair procedure or the
interpretation of a staute allegedly prohibiting the agency action, a
court is more likely to substitute its judgment and search for the
102. Id.
103. See note 99 supra.
104. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 843-847 (1976)) (Powell, J., concurring); WAIT
v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d
841 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See also, Strong, The Persistent Doctrine of Constitutional Fact, 48
N.C.L. REv. 223 (1968).
105. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976). See
generally Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicating Due Process in the
Administrative State, 63 CoRNEL L. REv. 445 (1977).
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correct answer rather than only an acceptable answer.' This be-
comes a safer statement if the record demonstrates the agency error
is obvious and if it relates to the plaintiff (checklist factor #3). A
court's eagerness to substitute its judgment for that of the agency,
however, will decrease, perhaps to the point of holding the matter
completely unreviewable, depending on the remedy requested and
the challenger's opportunity to obtain relief elsewhere"0 7 (checklist
factor #4). Finally, the purpose of the deferential canons of judicial
review, such as the substantial evidence test, the arbitrary, capri-
cious and abuse of discretion test and similar formulas, is to prevent
agencies from being turned into little more than conduits for the
transmission of cases to the courts. ' Thus, a court's choice of scope
of review, particularly since it is in part governed by the APA, is
influenced by the impact of judicial intervention on the orderly
conduct of governmental business (checklist factor #5). As the At-
torney General's Report noted in 1941:
If review is to extend to "correctness," then almost every contested
case would present the issue and almost every losing party would
entertain a reasonable belief that there is a substantial chance of
reversal. Second, if the agency has not exceeded its constitutional or
statutory authority, has made a proper interpretation of the law, has
conducted a fair proceeding and has not acted capriciously, the fea-
tures of expertness and specialization on the part of the administra-
tive agency would lend great weight to its inferences and conclu-
sions.,"
Of course, much water has passed over the dam since 1941, and, as
indicated, formulas governing scope of review are made of rubber,
not wood, and therefore expand and contract like other judicial
doctrines. Federal courts today are taking a harder look at some
special cases of interest to them, but as always the intensity of
106. See GELLHORN & BYSE, supra note 93, at 381, quoting REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROcEDuRE 87-88, 90-91 (1941). Of course, the sub-
stantial evidence rule (a rational basis test) limits the Court's scope of review of the raw and
basic facts found by the agency. See generally, 4 DAvis, supra note 6, § 29.01.
107. See, e.g., Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491 (1977).
108. See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMNISTRATrVE LAW 579 (1976), citing REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S COMMITEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 91 (1941).
109. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 79
(1941).
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judicial review will vary, as the Attorney General's report noted
back in 1941, depending on:
the character of the administrative agency, the nature of the prob-
lems with which it deals, the nature and consequences of the adminis-
trative action, the confidence which the agency has won, the degree
to which review would interfere with the agency's function or burden
the courts, the nature of the proceedings before the administrative
agency and similar factors."'
This, too, must be said: there is a reciprocal relationship between
scope of review and the threshold issues of judicial review. But this
is a highly personalized area depending largely on the individual
judge. With some judges, as the desire for increased scope of review
increases, the difficulty of surmounting the threshold obstacles de-
creases. But as more and more judges realize that agency expertise
has been oversold,"' and that bows "to the mysteries of administra-
tive expertise""' are increasingly inappropriate, the Supreme
Court, aware of the impact of judicial review on the orderly conduct
of th government's business including the drain on federal court
resources (checklist factor #5), has begun to tighten up the just
recently liberalized doctrines of standing, reviewability and the
other instrumental doctrines of judicial review that control the
quantity of cases, as well as the type of cases, decided by the federal
courts.
IV. CONCLUSION
Christopher Columbus Langdell, the first dean of Harvard Law
School, believed law to be a science, and he attempted to advance
the law by progressively simplifying it. Langdell put his idea this
way:
[Tihe number of fundamental legal doctrines is much less than is
commonly supposed; the many different guises in which the same
doctrine is constantly making its appearance, and the great extent to
110. Id. at 91.
111. See generally Schwartz, Legal Restrictions of Competition in the Regulated Indus-
tries: An Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67 HAIv. L. REv. 436, 471-75 (1954). ,
112. Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971) (Bazelon, J., concurring).
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which legal treatises are a repetition of each other, being the cause
of much misapprehension. If these doctrines could be so classified
and arranged that each should be found in its proper place, and
nowhere else, they would cease to be formidable from their number."'
Professor Gilmore tells us that the "Langdellians sought with
considerable success to formulate theories which would cover broad
areas of the common law and reduce an unruly diversity to a man-
ageable unity.""' 4 The relevance of the Langdellians is this: the
administrative common law governing judicial review conceivably
could be reduced to one concept, namely reviewability, which would
be shaped primarily by the five factors discussed in this article.
There would be no need to distinguish between standing, ripeness,
exhaustion of remedies, reviewability and so forth as if such con-
cepts were watertight, separate compartments. A federal court
would need only to explain that the matter was unreviewable, or
partly unreviewable, either because the injury was too trivial, the
issues too vague, the disruption of the government too great, or
because of some combination of the operative factors. Whether this
Langdellian "simplification""' would make administrative law
seem more or less Kafkaesque is a question I cannot answer with
certainty."' I merely wish to point out that any analysis which com-
pletely ignores obvious overlap also ignores the reality that adminis-
trative law is an unstable mass characterized by many internal in-
consistencies precisely because it cannot be set in place and fixed
by attaching to it those artificial labels about which we argue so
much.
113. G. GnIMORE, TE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 43 (1977) [hereinafter cited as GILMORE],
quoting from the preface of LANGDELL, CASES ON CONTRACTS (1871).
114. Id. at 43.
115. See note 2 supra.
116. Caveat: Professor Gilmore reminisced about the law as his professor, Wesley Sturges,
conceived it to be: that which "bore a striking resemblance to the more despairing novels of
Franz Kafka." GILMORE, supra note 113, at 81. Sturges taught Gilmore "to be forever on (his)
guard against the slippery generality, the received principle, the authoratative proposition."
GILMORE, supra note 113, at 139 n.31. Sturges taught Gilmore "to trust no one's judgment
except our own-and not to be too sure of that. He [Sturges] taught us, in a word, how to
be lawyers." Id. Yet Gilmore survived his professor's skepticism and has defined the law as
felicitously as anybody when he says: "The process by which a society accommodates to
change without abandoning its fundamental structure is what we mean by law." GILMORE,
supra note 113, at 14. The doctrine of judicial review in administrative law is an important
part of this process.
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To conclude, it has not been my intention to build a model but
rather to describe briefly the symbiotic relationship of doctrines
usually treated as separate chapter headings or key numbers. It has
been my argument that administrative law concepts governing judi-
cial review of agency action can be clarified by viewing them as
instrumental doctrines that are all shaped by the same five checklist
factors. This information may not help one predict the outcome of
a case any better than knowing there must be an offer, acceptance
and consideration before there is a contract,117 but it does demon-
strate that administrative law can be Langdellian as well as Kafka-
esque.
V. POSTSCRIPT
Readers of an earlier version of this article have submitted ques-
tions that identify matters inadequately addressed above.118 In this
postscript I respond partially to their thoughtful interrogatories.
The five factors do not represent any unified conception of the
judicial function, nor are they intended to serve as a model or as an
exhaustive list of the factors that shape judicial discretion. They
simply add up to a checklist that might be useful to academics and
others in the analysis of a case in which a party dissatisfied with
agency action seeks judicial review. The checklist can be dia-
grammed as follows:
117. Analytical frameworks do not by themselves generate answers to difficult cases. See
Ely, The Necklace, 87 HARv. L. Rev. 753 (1974).
118. Professor Richard B. Stewart asks:
1. Precisely why do you emphasize the five factors on the checklist?
2. Do they reflect some unified conception of the judicial function
3. What is the content of these factors? Some of them seem very fuzzy-simply a catch-all
for further analysis.
4. Should we abolish the traditional categories as a starting point and use the checklist
factors instead? If so, would the traditional categories continue to have a residual role-as
rows under your columns?
Professor Paul R. Verkuil comments: "It is not clear to me which factor predominates when
they are in opposition to as they inevitably will be." He notes that in my standing example,
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, the result is supported by factor #5 but
wonders whether the decision violates factor #4. See note 42 supra, and accompanying text.
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Type of Controversy
Exhaustion
Jurisdiction Reviewability Standing Ripeness of Remedies Etc.
Checklist factor #1
(degree of injury)
Checklist factor #2
(nature of question)
Checklist factor #3
(obviousness of error)
Checklist factor #4
(opportunity for relief)
Checklist factor #5
(impact of intervention) I I
Each checklist factor should be evaluated in terms of its potential
to induce review in a particular type of controversy; for example, a
grievous loss warrants a plus mark next to the checklist factor #1
category whereas a trivial, virtually de minimis loss warrants a
minus mark next to checklist factor #1. This process should be re-
peated with respect to all the checklist factors. The product often
is not a sure-fire guide that predicts the outcome of a "standing"
case or a "ripeness" case, but it does focus attention on the
strengths and weaknesses of the challenger's claim that the agency
action should be reviewed.
Admittedly the factors are general, quite fuzzy, and more work
needs to be done to sharpen and illuminate their scope."' On the
other hand, the specific content of the factors is constantly changing
as the administrative common law evolves, and the injection of too
much substance will reduce the long-run usefulness of the checklist
method of analyzing a case. As to which factor predominates, this
will depend on the outlook of the judge (whether he is an activist or
deferential to the particular federal agency) and the times. During
certain periods, for example, factor #4 might often subordinate fac-
tor #5 (for some judges), and during other periods factor #5 will be
regarded as more important than factor #4. This unstable aspect of
judicial review of agency action accounts in part for the Langdellian
and Kafkaesque reference in the title of the article. If the factors
119. Factor #4, for example, really embraces two distinct considerations: namely, the
opportunity of the rightholder to obtain relief without court intervention and the ability of
the court to provide the challenger with meaningful relief.
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were not dynamic and often in opposition to each other, there would
be hard and fast rules dictating the answers to almost all judicial
review controversies-contrary to my (not very radical) argument
that the law of judicial review is shaped largely by discretion.12
120. The factors partially describe what H.L.A. Hart calls the "rule of recognition." H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (passim) (1961). See Weinreb, Law as Order, 91 HARv. L. REv.
909, 923 (1978).
A recent case illustrates that the checklist suggested in this essay is no more than a start-
ing point for analysis. In Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 566 (1978), the
Court held there was jurisdiction to review an issue that the court of appeals held unreview-
able. The Court noted the challenger's injury was severe (criminal sanctions); the question
presented was one of law, not fact; agency errors in designating what are "emission stan-
dards" within the meaning of a statute are readily detectable by courts; preclusion would
negate the opportunity of many individuals adversely affected by agency action to obtain
protection against arbitrary decision; and the narrow judicial inquiry authorized by the Court
does not disrupt, but enhances, the orderly conduct of governmental business. Utilizing the
same factors, the dissenters concluded the agency action was unreviewable. The dissenting
opinion noted, inter alia, that the challenger did not claim his constitutional rights were
violated; no one had questioned the agency's statutory authority; the challenged interpreta-
tion was within the agency's "special province" and involved complicated factual and discre-
tionary judgments entitled to deference; the challenger would have been entitled to file a
petition for review in a District of Columbia court; and the majority's construction of the
statute denied the agency power to regulate effectively poisonous substances which pose an
"especially grave threat to human health." 98 S. Ct. at 577.
Thus all five checklist factors were marshalled by the majority one way and another way
by the dissent. Is administrative law Langdellian or despairingly incongruous?
